Horizontal Transfer and Promotion : New Evidence and an Interpretation from the Perspective of Task-Specific Human Capital by Sasaki, Masaru et al.
    
           OSIPP Discussion Paper : DP-2012-E-006  
 
Horizontal Transfer and Promotion: New Evidence and an
 
        
Interpretation from the Perspective of Task-Specific Human Capital 
April 03, 2012 
Masaru Sasaki, Osaka University and IZA 
Katsuya Takii, Osaka University
 Junmin Wan, Fukuoka University 
 
【キーワード】J62, M51; Rotation, Promotion and Task-Specific Human Capital  
【要約】This paper provides new evidence about horizontal transfer and promotion 
using the largest available personnel panel data in Japan and interprets them from 
the perspective of task-specific human capital.  We find that firms synchronize their 
employees' promotion and horizontal transfers.  Then, we show theoretically that 
task-specific human capital can naturally generate such synchronization.  We also 
find that the directors in an accounting department have the highest probability of 
being promoted to become board members, while those in a research department have 
the lowest.  This suggests that top managers need a balanced skill set, in which 
allocative skill is relatively important.    
We are grateful to Ken Ariga, Shingo Ishiguro, Takao Kato, Fumio Ohtake and Kengo 
Yasui, as well as the seminar participants at the Trans-Pacific Labor Seminar 2011 
and Kansai Labor Workshop, for helpful comments.  Financial support from the 
Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology 
(Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research) is gratefully acknowledged. Masaru Sasaki: 
Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University 1-7 Machikaneyama, Toyonaka, 
Osaka 560-0043 Japan. sasaki@econ.osaka-u.ac.jp. Katsuya Takii: Osaka School of 
International Public Policy, Osaka University, 1-31, Machikameyama, Toyonaka, 
Osaka, 560-0043, Japan. takii@osipp.osaka-u.ac.jp. Junmin Wan: Faculty of 
Economics, Fukuoka University, 8-19-1 Nanakuma, Jonanku, Fukuoka City, 814-0180, 
Japan. wan@econ.fukuoka-u.ac.jp.
 
1
1. Introduction
The internal labor market has been widely investigated since Doeringer and Piore
(1971) described the characteristics of an internal labor market quite differently
from those of an external labor market. Many theories have been proposed and
more evidence has been accumulated, but there are still many unexplored aspects
of internal labor markets.
The relationship between horizontal transfer and promotion is one of them.
Although several excellent surveys of internal labor markets have been published,
they typically do not deal with horizontal transfers [e.g., Lazear (1998), Gibbons
and Waldman (1999b) and Lazear and Oyer (2007)]. Knowing that there are
frequent horizontal transfers in reality, this lack of attention to them by academics
is surprising. One possible reason is the lack of suitable data. Data on internal
labor markets are typically confidential, and it is not easy to access data that
describe individual movements across several functional departments. Without
reliable evidence, it is conceivable that economists find it difficult to develop a
reasonable theory on horizontal transfers.
In fact, the relationship between horizontal transfer and promotion is likely
to provide useful information on the benefits and costs of skills acquisition. On
one hand, as horizontal transfers lead to the acquisition of multitask skills, the
observed career path should be designed to acquire the necessary task-specific
skills after promotion. Hence, we may possibly obtain information on the types of
skills required of top managers. On the other hand, as the reallocation of workers
across jobs is accompanied by reallocation costs, observed career paths must be
designed to save such costs. As the loss of skills inherent in reallocation across
jobs is likely to be a main candidate for the costs of reallocation, investigation of
2
the interaction between horizontal transfer and promotion should provide useful
information on the transferability of skills across jobs.
This paper provides new evidence on the relationship between horizontal trans-
fer across functional departments and vertical promotion using the largest person-
nel panel data set in Japan. In order to obtain coherent information from that
data, this paper adopts, as a conceptual framework, the notion of task-specific
human capital, the importance of which is emphasized by Gibbons and Waldman
(2004, 2006). They conjectured that the reason firms employ job rotation is to
minimize the underutilization of task-specific human capital when promotions take
place. However, because they do not have any evidence about horizontal trans-
fers, their formal model in Gibbons and Waldman (2006) is designed to explain
evidence about promotion without horizontal transfer and, therefore, their mod-
eled task-specific human capital cannot be distinguished from rank-specific human
capital. This paper shows that the difference between task-specific human capital
and rank-specific human capital is important in understanding evidence on the
relationship between horizontal transfer and vertical promotion.
Four findings are worthy of special mention. Firstly, we find that there is
a robust correlation between the timing of promotion and horizontal transfer.
Eriksson and Ortega (2006) identify three promising theories of horizontal trans-
fer: horizontal transfer makes employees acquire multitask skills, helps employers
learn about employees’ abilities, and mitigates boredom. Ariga (2006) points out
that job creation and destruction can influence the pattern of horizontal transfer.
However, none of these theories can explain the synchronization of decisions.
We construct a model that shows that the synchronization of promotion and
horizontal transfer occurs if and only if the reallocation cost is strictly submodular
with respect to vertical promotion and horizontal transfer. In order to derive an
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economic interpretation of this result, we also provide a theoretical basis for the
submodular cost function from the perspective of task-specific human capital.
This shows that the reallocation cost resulting from the accumulation of the task-
specific skills required for a new position is in general submodular, and that it is
strictly submodular if and only if there is duplication of new tasks required for
the new functional department and ranked position. Through the lens of this
theory, the synchronization of the promotion decision and the horizontal transfer
decision can be interpreted as a practice to save the reallocation costs that arise
from the duplication of the required tasks.
Note that the strict submodularity of the reallocation cost function cannot be
derived from department-specific human capital and rank-specific human capital
because it must have common tasks and therefore common skills between functions
and ranks. Therefore, only task-specific human capital can explain the evidence.
Secondly, we find that directors are more frequently transferred to other func-
tional departments than section managers. Task-specific human capital can also
explain this evidence. We show theoretically that if the marginal benefits from
multitask skills are larger for directors than for section managers, the higher-
ranked managers are more likely to be transferred to other functional depart-
ments.
Thirdly, we find that directors who belong to an accounting department have
the highest probability of being promoted to board membership, while those who
belong to a research department have the lowest. In particular, even after con-
trolling for the measure that is likely to be correlated with unobserved ability,
those department dummy variables never lose their significance. Note that there
is no other hierarchical position in between directors and board members. Hence,
if skills accumulated during directorships are needed after promotion, the theory
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of task-specific human capital predicts that there must be tasks that are com-
mon between directors and board members. That is, our findings provide useful
information on skills that are relatively important for top managers. With the
assistance of several theories of entrepreneurial ability [e.g., Schultz (1975), Takii
(2003) and Lazear (2005)], we interpret our evidence that top managers need
balanced skill sets with relatively large weighting on their allocative skills.
Fourthly, we also find that once we restrict our attention to relatively large
firms, not only the coefficient of the accounting department dummy on promotion
but also that of the personnel department dummy retain their significance after
controlling for the proxies of unobserved ability. This is interesting, because the
large role of personnel departments is likely to be specific to Japan. Jacoby
(2005) points out that, compared with U.S. companies, human resource staffs
are centralized and conduct organization-oriented employment decisions in Japan,
and human resource departments rank relatively highly in the corporate hierarchy.
Knowing that the role of the personnel department is more than just allocating
workers, evidence indicates that not only allocative ability but also the ability
to supervise workers to maintain Japanese employment practices is an important
skill for top managers in Japan’s large companies.
Several previous papers have empirically investigated internal labor markets.
Although the majority of papers focus on promotion (e.g., Rosenbaum (1984),
Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994a, 1994b) and Ariga, Ohkusa and Brunello
(1999)), as horizontal transfer is a common practice in the major companies in
Japan, Japan’s labor economists accumulate relatively more evidence on hori-
zontal transfer. Among them, Koike (1991) proposed an influential hypothesis.
Koike argues that the breadth of horizontal transfers measures the level of ‘in-
telligent skill’, which is needed to deal with uncertainty. Following this Koike
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hypothesis, many Japanese economists examine the breadth of horizontal transfer
(e.g., Kakizawa et al. (2004)) and its effect on promotion (e.g., Ariga (2006)),
based on evidence from a single firm or questionnaires from a small sample. In
contrast to these papers, this paper focuses on the skills that are relatively impor-
tant for top managers, and on the cost of acquiring multitask skills, based on a
representative sample of relatively upper-level managers in Japanese companies.
Although most empirical studies on the internal labor market are based on
case studies or questionnaires from a small sample, Eriksson and Ortega (2006) is
a notable exception. They conduct a firm-level analysis using a large employer—
employee matched data set in Denmark. Our personnel data set is based on
questionnaires from all publicly traded companies and many privately owned com-
panies in Japan. It covers all board members in publicly traded companies and a
large sample of directors and section managers. Hence, we can demonstrate the
average features of Japan’s internal labor market for relatively upper-level man-
agers. Using the advantages of the unique data set we have not seen elsewhere, we
conduct an individual-level analysis and provide more detailed information on the
relationship between promotion and horizontal transfer. Hopefully, our evidence
nicely complements the existing case studies.
Finally, several recent papers point out the importance of task-specific skills.
Lazear (2009) derives a firm-specific human capital as a firm-specific combination
of task-specific human capital and discusses why firms pay for the cost of skill
accumulation that do not appear to be firm specific. Geel, Mure and Backes-
Gellner (2008) provide evidence that supports the prediction of Lazear’s model.
Gathmann and Schönberg (2007) measure the level of task-specific human capital
and show empirically that task-specific human capital is an important determinant
of wage growth and occupational mobility. Unlike these papers, we use the model
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of task-specific human capital as a device to obtain coherent information from our
data. We also show that task-specific human capital can generate synchronized
decisions on promotion and horizontal transfer. We believe that our theory and
evidence is complementary to theirs.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section overviews features of
internal labor markets in Japan. The third section explains our data set. The
fourth section compares our data set with publicly available aggregate statistics
to examine potential biases due to sample selection. The fifth section investi-
gates career paths when managers are section managers or directors. We pay
special attention to the timing of promotion and horizontal transfer, and show
robust evidence that the timing is fairly closely correlated. We also provide our
explanation for the synchronized decisions from the perspective of task-specific
human capital. The sixth section investigates the probability of promotion from
director to board member. In particular, we are interested in how the likelihood
of promotion to board membership depends on the department where they were
a director. We provide robust evidence that being in an accounting department
has the strongest impact on the promotion, and discuss a possible interpretation
of our finding. The final section concludes and discusses future extension of the
research.
2. The Internal Labor Market in Japan
Japan’s labor market is said to be unique. Milgrom and Roberts (1992) describe
common views on human resource practices in major Japanese firms: long-term
employment guarantees, and recruiting of permanent employees at early stages of
their careers. Ariga, Brunello and Ohkusa (2000) characterize several features
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of the internal labor market in large Japanese firms as having (1) seniority-based
promotion and a late selection approach, (2) centralized allocation of workers to
jobs, (3) extensive job rotation and internal transfers, and (4) well-defined ports
of entry and a strong preference for recruitment of those have just left school
without having been employed elsewhere . Finally, as Kaplan (1994) documents,
it is also well known that the majority of board members in Japanese companies
are selected from inside the companies and that most CEOs are chosen from
among board members.
These features of the Japanese data give us several advantages. Firstly, long-
term employment guarantees can mitigate an attrition bias due to turnover. Our
data set is based on questionnaires to major companies in Japan. Therefore,
we lose observations when an employee quits those companies. Although there
may be concern about possible selection bias, the relatively low turnover rate
of middle managers in Japan makes it possible to believe that the bias is fairly
small. Secondly, centralized allocation of workers to jobs means that observing
reallocation of employees inside a firm allows us to infer intended strategies held by
the firm. In particular, if horizontal transfer is a way to accumulate skills needed
after promotion, and a firm tries to save the cost inherent in the reallocation of
employees, the firm’s intentions should be reflected in the data.
Of course, this unique feature of Japan’s labor market is likely to influence
some dimensions of the statistics. Koike (2002a) compares the career paths of
white-collar workers in companies in Japan, the U.S., England and Germany,
and summarizes three unique features of internal careers in Japan: (1) Japanese
career paths in a firm are relatively broader than in other countries, (2) while
most promotion is from inside firms in Japan, more managers are employed from
outside in other countries, and (3) the Japanese promotion system is relatively
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slow. Jacoby (2005) compares Japan’s internal labor market with the U.S. internal
labor market and points out the stronger role of personnel departments in Japan.
As we discuss later, we can confirm some of these features from our data: the
speed of promotion is still slow, and there are relatively high promotion proba-
bilities from personnel as well as accounting departments to board membership
in relatively large firms. After experiencing a burst bubble, Japanese life-long
employment practices are now often accused of being inflexible and in need of
restructuring. Interestingly, our observations indicate that employment practices
in Japan have not changed much, even after several critiques of the employment
system.
Nonetheless, this uniqueness does not mean that the lessons from the Japanese
internal labor market are irrelevant to other countries. Koike (2002a) also points
out some common features of the internal careers of white-collar workers: (1) in all
countries, workers spend most of their careers in a functional department, and (2)
on-the-job training (OJT) plays a major role in skills acquisition. Because OJT
plays a major role in skills acquisition, it is necessary for top managers to acquire
multitask skills, and firms in most countries must face similar problems: how to
economize on reallocation costs. Therefore, at least the qualitative relationship
between promotion and horizontal transfer is less likely to be specific to Japan.
3. Data Description
Our personnel data are based on the information files for board members, re-
gardless of representation rights, directors (Bucho) and section managers (Kacho)
collected by Diamond Inc.. Diamond Inc. sells its files to customers who need
them for a variety of reasons: developing marketing strategies, maintaining cus-
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tomer information or sending direct mail to the relevant personnel in a company.
We obtained the historical data in this file from 1998 to 2005, which comprises
our unbalanced panel data.
As our data were not originally designed for research purposes, we need to
take particular care in our use of the data. After reading various documents,
we conducted an interview with an editor in chief at the editorial department in
the information service office of Diamond Inc. In order to investigate the rep-
resentativeness of the data, we also compare the aggregate statistics constructed
by our data set with the aggregate statistics based on the Basic Survey on Wage
Structure (BSWS hereafter), which is released by the Ministry of Health, Labour
and Welfare (MHLW hereafter). In this section, we first describe features of the
data revealed by the documentation and our interview. In the next section, we
describe the results of our comparison of the aggregate statistics sets.
Diamond Inc. sends out its questionnaire to the general affairs department
or personnel department of companies once a year, and collects information for
board members, directors and section managers. It also collects data from several
press releases to maintain up-to-date information. According to the chief editor,
80 percent of publicly traded firms reply to their questionnaires. If they do not
receive any response from a firm, they fill out part of the questionnaire from that
firm’s financial reports. As board members in the publicly traded companies
are obligated to reveal their names, our data set contains all board members of
publicly traded companies.
It also covers many nonlisted companies. According to the chief editor, al-
though the precise criteria for sending a questionnaire change slightly over time,
they send them to all relatively large companies. For example, in 2006, Diamond
Inc. sent a questionnaire to nonlisted companies that had more than 100 employ-
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ees and capital stock (Shihon Kin) of more than 30 million yen. In total, the
data set contained about 14,000 companies in September 2006. Hence, it covers
most of the major companies in Japan.
We initially wondered why so many firms had an incentive to answer the
questionnaire, and suspected that there might have been some monetary compen-
sation. However, the editor in chief denied our presumption, and insisted that
firms were not motivated by any monetary incentive. According to him, as Di-
amond Inc. has provided personnel information since 1935, many firms consider
being listed in the data set as prestigious. He conjectured that the prestige of
their products would be the reason for many records.
Another advantage of this information file is that it contains information on
directors and section managers. Hence, we can potentially examine the average
career patterns for relatively upper-level managers in Japan.
Unfortunately, the disclosure of information is not mandatory, and the disclo-
sure strategies of firms are not well specified. The presumption for our analysis is
that their disclosure strategies are independent of unobserved characteristics of in-
dividuals that can influence the speed of promotion and the probability of transfer
to another department. Several assignment theories (e.g., Waldman (1984)) sug-
gest that firms have incentives to hide information on the talents of their workers
so that outside firms cannot make selective offers to the more talented workers. If
these theories are correct, because the disclosure policies of firms that reflect their
evaluations of their workers reveal information about the unobserved abilities of
their workers, we expect that the disclosure policies of the firms should be inde-
pendent of their evaluations of their workers. The interview with the editor in
chief roughly confirmed our presumption. According to him, each firm has its own
policy about how willing they are to reveal their information, and firms routinely
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answer the questionnaire every year based on their specific policies. Although
relatively larger and more traditional firms tend to disclose more information, he
did not think that firms’ disclosure strategies depended on unobserved individual
characteristics. He also said that because employees themselves can access their
own information, if firms’ disclosure strategies depended on unobserved individ-
ual characteristics, the firms’ disclosure decision could cause the employees some
concern.
In order to check the validity of his statement, we checked potential bias by
comparing the aggregate statistics constructed from our data set with the aggre-
gate statistics based on BSWS in the next section.
4. Comparison between Diamond Survey and Basic Survey
on Wage Structure
In order to understand a potential bias inherent in the Diamond survey, we com-
pared the aggregate statistics of the Diamond survey with those of the BSWS. In
this section, we briefly explain the notable characteristics of the Diamond survey,
and have placed more detailed information in the Appendix.
The BSWS aims to obtain a clear picture of the wage structure of employees
in major industries. The MHLW sends the survey to randomly selected estab-
lishments every year from July 1st to July 31st. Establishments are selected by a
uniform sampling method from establishments (private establishments and estab-
lishments of public corporations) with 10 regular employees or more and private
establishments with 5 to 9 regular employees. Then, the employees are selected
by a uniform sampling method from the selected establishments. The BSWS
contains information on directors (Bucho) and section managers (Kacho). The
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MHLW provides the age distribution and the length of tenure by industry and
the size of firms. We use this aggregate data to assess the potential biases of the
Diamond survey.
During our investigation, we realized that age distributions in the manufac-
turing sector in the two data sets were relatively similar, while there were some
notable differences in other industries. Hence, we decided to use only the manu-
facturing sector for our investigation.
The BSWS was conducted as of June 30th for facts in fixed time such as age
and tenure. On the other hand, the Diamond survey updates an individual’s
record every time there are press releases, and we often observed that the record
was updated more than once within one year. To create yearly-based panel data,
we picked up information on the individual as of August every year. The Diamond
survey collects questionnaires from all publicly traded companies between June
and August of each year, and roughly 62 percent of data is updated in July or
August. Hence, we aggregated the Diamond survey at the end of August, which
roughly corresponds to the information around June.
Because the instructions on the BSWS state that deputy managers of a de-
partment (ji-cho) are not included in either directors or section managers, we also
excluded deputy managers of a department for the purpose of this comparison1.
However, as there is no economic reason to exclude deputy managers of a depart-
ment from our analysis, we include them in the directors’ group for our analysis in
the following section. The BSWS instructions also suggest that when an employee
is both a director and a board member, he is treated only as a director. The
1Including deputy managers of a department in section managers or directors does not change
the results of a comparison between the two data sets. Estimation results are available upon
request.
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Diamond survey identifies the main and secondary positions for each respondent
separately. We considered a person as a director only when a company reported
that his main position was as a director2.
Because the BSWS reveals information only for male managers, we compare
data for male managers. Because female managers are scarce, this does not reduce
the number of observations very much. We also drop samples that show logically
inconsistent observations: one who is less than 15 years old, has a negative value
of tenure, and starts a job when their age is less than 15. These data selection
processes eliminate 18.14 percent of data.
Figure 1 shows the ratio of the number of directors and section managers in
the Diamond survey to that in the BSWS. Because the number appearing in
the BSWS is the estimated population, figures show the estimated proportion of
directors and section managers that the Diamond survey actually covers.
There are three notable features of the Diamond survey. Firstly, there is large
coverage of male directors in the manufacturing sector. In particular, even after
data selection for our analysis, it covers 60 percent of male directors in companies
with more than 1000 regular employees until 2000.
Secondly, the coverage gradually declines, especially in large companies. Dur-
ing this period, Japanese society was quite sensitive regarding the protection of
personal information. In order to introduce the Basic Resident Register Network
in 2002, the protection of privacy became a political issue. In addition, several
information leakages occurred in this period. In the end, the Diet passed a per-
sonal information protection law in 2003. This change in public opinion is likely
to reduce the number of responses to the Diamond survey. However, it should
2Including secondary positions does not influence the results from the comparison of the two
data sets.
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be noted that the Diamond survey still covered more than 10 percent of directors
in Japan in 2005. Hence, this is still the largest data set we can obtain for the
analysis of upper-level managers’ careers in Japan.
Finally, the number of directors is much larger than the number of section
managers. It indicates that most firms have strategies to reveal more information
for higher-ranked managers. As the data do not show the hierarchical structure
that is typical of most organizations, these data are not suitable for examining
the structure of firms.
In order to understand the features of the Diamond survey in detail, we inves-
tigate the ratio of the number of directors and section managers in the Diamond
survey to that in the BSWS by age group. In order to save space, we discuss
only the data for 1998 and 2005, but similar results are obtained in other years3.
Figure 2 shows that the response rate is roughly the same between ages 40 and
60, while it is fairly high for other age groups. As shown below, the majority of
directors and section managers are aged between 40 and 60. Hence, this unac-
countable feature of the data is less likely to influence the analysis below, although
in order to check the robustness of our results, we also conduct our analysis using
the subsample covering ages 40 to 60.
We compare the age distribution and the length of tenure by age group in both
data sets by a firm size. Because we obtain similar results in other years, we again
report only the results in 1998 and 20054. Note that the response rate is highest
in 1998 and lowest in 2005. Hence, the deviation of the Diamond survey from
the BSWS is smallest in 1998 and largest in 2005. Figure 3 shows the results.
3The results in other years are reported in figures A-1 to B-6 of the Appendix.
4The results for the other firms in other years are reported in figures C-1 to H-6 in the
Appendix.
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Despite several differences between the Diamond survey and the BSWS, the
age distribution and the length of tenure by age group in both data sets are quite
similar. In particular, the age distribution in 1998 is almost identical in any firm
size groups. Although some notable differences between the Diamond Survey
and the BSWS appear in 2005, the age distribution in the Diamond Survey still
broadly captures the respective age distributions in 2005. We can also find some
differences in the length of tenure after the age of 60. However, the overall picture
is the same before the age of 60.
Note that the similarity of the age distribution and the length of tenure by
age group holds, even though there is no clear-cut definition of directors (Bucho)
and section managers (Kacho). The Diamond Inc. itself classifies several cate-
gories of positions into directors and section managers, while in the BSWS, each
establishment is asked to classify them. As there is no objective definition of
directors and section managers, some classifications are influenced subjectively.
Nonetheless, the similarity of age distribution and length of tenure suggests that
there are some common views on these hierarchical ranks. This means that there
is some merit in statistically investigating hierarchical ranks in an economy.
In summary, the Diamond survey captures the overall picture of age distribu-
tion and length of tenure by age very well, at least for a carefully chosen subsam-
ple. This observation is consistent with one of our presumptions, namely that the
firm’s disclosure strategy is independent of unobserved individual characteristics.
Knowing that this is the largest currently available data set that contains informa-
tion on careers for upper-level managers, it is worth extracting information from
this data set, albeit with some caution.
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5. From Section Managers to Directors
In this section, we first analyze the relationship between horizontal transfer and
promotion when managers are section managers or directors. Let us first describe
the simple summary statistics for the speed of promotion to become a director, the
transition matrix across functional departments and the breadth of job transfer
across functional groups.
Table 1 shows the average tenure and age when employees are promoted to
become a director. It shows that the average tenure is roughly 24 years and the
average age is 48 years when employees are promoted to directorships in Japan.
These numbers roughly confirm the standard view that the speed of promotion
in Japanese firms is slow. Table 1 also shows that the average tenure and the
average age do not change over time. Because we know the composition of firm
size changes in our sample, we also report the average tenure and the average
age for firms with 1000 or more employees. Observing that the average age and
tenure remain unchanged using the sample of large firms, the selection problem
seems minimal. Hence, slow promotion is less likely to be the result of sample
selection.
In order to investigate horizontal transfers, we categorize departments into
nine functional groups: general affairs & press, personnel, accounting, planning,
international affairs, research & development, production, sales and others. Table
2 and Table 3 show the transition probabilities across functional groups between
the previous year and the current year. Table 2 shows the transition probability
matrices when section managers and directors are not promoted; Table 3 shows
the matrix for when section managers are promoted to become directors.
The prominent feature of the transition matrixes is that the diagonal of the
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matrix is fairly large. This means that transition across functional groups does
not occur frequently. This is consistent with Koike’s observation that employees
spend most of their careers in one functional group (2002a).
More importantly, a comparison of Table 2 and Table 3 reveals a notable
difference: the transition across functional departments increases at the same
time that employees are promoted. That is, the promotion and horizontal transfer
decisions are synchronized.
In order to quantify the magnitude of the difference, we construct a measure
of the average breadth of a job transfer across functional departments. We define
the breadth of job transfers across functional groups at company j as follows:
Breadthj = 1−
9X
i
shareiP (fj,+1 = i|fj = i)
where P (fj,+1 = i|fj = i) is the probability of having a job in functional group i
at company j in the next year when one currently has a job in the same functional
group at the same company, and sharei for i = 1...9 represents the distribution
of section managers (or directors) among functional departments. The aver-
age breadth of job transfer is a weighted average of this breadth measure across
companies with the number of observations as its weight. This measure can be
interpreted as the average probability of being transferred to a different functional
group.
Table 4 shows our measure of the average breadth. It shows that when they
are section managers (directors), only 11 (17) percent of employees are trans-
ferred to other functional departments; when employees are promoted from sec-
tion managers to become directors in a year, 33 percent of employees experience
job transfers. Hence, the transition probability to a different functional group is
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two or three times larger when they are promoted. That is, a firm synchronizes
its promotion and transfer decisions. Note that the result is also robust across
years, implying that it is less likely to be the result of measurement error.
Interestingly, the measure of average breadth also reveals that directors are
more likely to be transferred to other functional departments than section man-
agers. It indicates that when there is no promotion, higher-ranked managers are
more likely to be transferred to other functional departments.
Because these observations are not emphasized in previous literature, it is
worth scrutinizing them more closely. Firstly, we examine whether location
changes may influence the measure of breadth. We split the sample by whether
employees move from headquarters to headquarters, from branch to headquarters,
from headquarters to branch or from branch to branch, and estimate our measure
of average breadth by each subsample. The results are also reported in Table 4.
This shows that the overall picture does not change across subsamples. It shows
that the probability of being transferred to other functional departments when
employees are promoted from section managers to become directors is still two or
three times larger than when they stay as section managers (when they stay as
directors) in all samples. This indicates that location changes have little effect
on the frequency of horizontal transfers.
We also investigate whether controlling several observable characteristics of
employees and firms eliminates the results. For this purpose, we investigate the
following random logit model. We assume that horizontal transfer occurs between
t+1 and t if and only if ytj ≥ 0 where ytj is an unobserved latent variable of jth
individuals at year t. We also assume that ytj is determined by:
ytj = α0 + αpI (promotion) + αdI (directors) + β0xtj + γt + γj + εtj
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where I (promotion) ( I (directors) ) is 1 when the promotion occurs (an em-
ployee is a director) and 0 otherwise, xtj is a vector of observed characteristics
of jth individuals at year t, γt is a year dummy, γj is an unobserved individual
specific factor that is independently identically normally distributed with mean 0
and variance σ2γ, and εtj are independently identically Gumbel distributed. The
control variables include individual characteristics such as tenure, experience at
other companies and education dummies, the characteristics of the firm to which
the individual belongs, such as the dummy for listed companies, firm size and the
two-digit classification of manufacturing industry, and year dummies. The details
of the control variables are explained in the Appendix.
Table 5 reports the result of the random logit model. It shows that the pro-
motion dummy is positive and significant, which suggests that there are some
unobservable reasons for the synchronization of promotion and horizontal trans-
fer5. It also shows that the director dummy is also positive and significant,
although the coefficient is much smaller than that of the promotion dummy. We
also conduct two robustness checks. Firstly, because we know that data would
be more reliable between ages 40 and 59, we only use data for this age group
and conduct the same regression analysis. Secondly, because there are gradual
reductions in the response rate in our sample over time, we also conduct the same
regression using the subsample that contains a relatively high response rate: be-
tween 1999 and 2002. The second and third columns in Table 5 show the results
of these robustness checks. This shows that the coefficient and significance of
the promotion dummy and the director dummy do not change very much, which
5Here, we pay attention to the synchronization of promotion and horizontal transfer, but not
the causality. Therefore, we have no intention of claiming from this evidence that the promotion
decision causes horizontal transfer.
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confirms that firms synchronize their promotion decisions and horizontal transfer
decisions and that higher-ranked managers are likely to be transferred to other
functional departments.
A Formal Model to Explain the Evidence: Now we are ready to formalize
our explanation of the evidence. Suppose that the order of functional transfers is
exogenously given. For example, a firm might decide to transfer a worker with
experience in the sales department to the planning department. If a firm uses the
transfer as a means of building its workers’ multiple job experience, the sequence of
transfers must be designed to achieve the accumulation of skills. Our assumption
means that we take this sequence as exogenously given. This assumption can
be relaxed, but greatly simplifies our notation. Let i denote the ith functional
department to which a worker is transferred. This means that i also measures
the amount of multitasking an employee obtains by working in different functional
departments.
Suppose that when employees with characteristics x and i functional experi-
ences produce y (r, i, x) + ε (r, i), r ∈ {s, d} when they are section managers, s, or
directors, d and y (b, i, x)+ε (b) when they are board members. It is assumed that
ε (s, i), ε (d, i) and ε (b) are independently identically Gumbel distributed. This
random variable captures the demand effects on promotions and horizontal trans-
fers suggested by Ariga (2006). The vector, x, can include observable variables
for individual characteristics, firm characteristics and time dummies. We assume
that x evolves through the function x0 = g (x, u) where u is some stochastic fac-
tor. These dynamics allow human capital accumulation through experience and
employer learning about the ability of employees. Hence, the model by Gibbons
and Waldman (1999a) can be consistent with this model.
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Suppose that both promotion and horizontal transfer of section managers and
directors are accompanied by reallocation costs, C (p, h), where p means the deci-
sion on promotion and h means the decision on horizontal transfer. Both p and
h are 0 or 1, where 0 means that workers stay in the same position and 1 means
that workers move to new positions. The reallocation cost from directors who
belong to the ith functional department to board members is given by Cb (i).
We assume that wage payments can be negotiated in each period without
any transaction costs. Therefore, the Coase theorem suggests that we can fo-
cus on Pareto optimal reallocation of employees without questioning who makes
a decision. Hence, without loss of generality, we assume that a firm makes the
reallocation decision and maximizes the total surplus between a firm and an em-
ployee.
After producing output, a firm must decide whether the section manager
should stay in the current position, move to another functional department as
a section manager, be promoted to become a director of the same functional de-
partment, or be promoted to become a director of another functional department.
Similarly, after producing output, a firm must decide whether the director should
stay in the current position, move to another functional department as a director,
or be promoted to board membership. Let β (x) ∈ (0, 1) for all x denote a dis-
count factor, which is a mixture of a standard discount factor and the probability
of employees staying in this firm. We allow that the probability of staying in the
firm can be a function of x.
We assume that the reservation values of both employees and the firm are 0.
Then, the present value of the stream of the total surplus from employing section
managers, directors and board members with i different department experience,
W (s, i, x),W (d, i, x) andW (b, i, x), are expressed by the following Bellman equa-
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tions:
W (s, i, x) = y (s, i, x) + ε (s, i) + β (x)
Z
V (s, i, x0) dFs ({ε (r, j)} , u) ,
where V (s, i, x0) = max
⎧
⎨
⎩
W (s, i, x0)− C (0, 0) ,W (s, i+ 1, x0)− C (0, 1) ,
W (d, i, x0)− C (1, 0) ,W (d, i+ 1, x0)− C (1, 1)
⎫
⎬
⎭, r ∈
{s, d} and j ∈ {i, i+ 1}, and
W (d, i, x) = y (d, i, x) + ε (d, i) + β (x)
Z
V (d, i, x0) dFd ({ε (d, j)} , ε (b) , u)
where V (d, i, x0) = max {W (d, i, x0)− C (0, 0) ,W (d, i+ 1, x0)− C (0, 1) , W (b, i, x0)− Cb (i)}
and j ∈ {i, i+ 1}, and
W (b, i, x) = y (b, i, x) + ε (b) + β (x)
Z
W (b, i, x0) dFb (ε (b) , u) .
The cost C (0, 0) can be 0, but it does not have to be. It can be interpreted as
the cost of maintaining the current skill.
Let Pss (i+ 1|s, s, i) Psd (i+ 1|d, s, i) and Pdd (i+ 1|d, d, i) denote the proba-
bility of moving to another functional department when section managers are not
promoted, when section managers are promoted to become directors and when di-
rectors are not promoted, respectively. Then, we can prove the following theorem.
The proof is established in the Appendix.
Theorem 1. The probability of being transferred to another functional depart-
ment is larger when promotion occurs than when employees are directors if and
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only if the reallocation cost is strictly submodular with respect to promotion and
horizontal transfer:
Pdd (i+ 1|d, d, i) < Pds (i+ 1|d, s, i) , iff C (0, 0) + C (1, 1) < C (0, 1) + C (1, 0) .
Suppose that the marginal benefits from multitask skills are larger for directors
than for section managers, y (d, i+ 1, x) − y (d, i, x) > y (s, i+ 1, x) − y (s, i, x).
Then, there exists β∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that for all β (x) ≤ β∗, the probability of
being transferred to another functional department is larger when employees are
directors than when they are section managers:
Pss (i+ 1|s, s, i) < Pdd (i+ 1|d, d, i) .
The second part of theorem 1 shows how multitask skills influence the dif-
ferences in the transfer probability of directors and section managers. When
additional new functional experience is more valuable for directors than for sec-
tion managers, unless the discount factor is too big, the probability of changing
functional departments should be higher for directors than section managers.
More importantly, the first part of theorem 1 derives the condition that the
synchronization of promotion and horizontal transfer does occur. The intuition
behind these results is as follows. Suppose that y (r, i, x) = y and that there is
no cost of maintaining skills, C (0, 0) = 0. In this case, the random realizations
of {ε (d, i)} are the only reason for the reallocation of employees. If a section
manager in a functional department i is transferred to a functional department
i + 1 without promotion, the reallocation cost is C (0, 1); if a section manager
in a functional department i is transferred to a functional department i + 1 as
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a director, the reallocation cost is C (1, 1). Note that when a firm decides that
an employee should be promoted, the firm has in effect already decided to pay
the reallocation cost of C (1, 0). Hence, the additional cost for transferring the
employee to the other functional department is C (1, 1)− C (1, 0). The theorem
shows that synchronized decisions are likely to occur if and only if the additional
cost of reallocation is larger when section managers are not promoted than when
they are promoted, C (0, 1) > C (1, 1)− C (1, 0).
Micro Foundation of Submodular Reallocation Cost Function: Evidence
suggests that transportation costs are unlikely to be the source of the realloca-
tion cost. We conjecture that the cost accompanying skills accumulation is an
alternative candidate. We provide a theoretical basis for the submodular cost
function from the perspective of task-specific human capital.
Let
³
Y,Θ, Cˆ
´
be a measure space where Y is a set, Θ is a σ−algebra of its
subsets, and Cˆ is a measure defined on Θ. We assume that the measure Cˆ (H)
where H ∈ Θ represents the cost of acquiring skills in a task set H. Let Hr ∈ Θ
and Hj ∈ Θ denote the set of tasks required to perform a job at rank r ∈ {s, d}
and in functional department j ∈ {i, i+ 1}, respectively.
Suppose that an employee is currently assigned to a functional department
j = i as a section manager r = s and obtains all the skills corresponding to the
tasks inHs∪Hi. Let Hn (p, h) ∈ Θ denote the set of new tasks needed to perform
new jobs, where p ∈ {1, 0} means the decision on promotion and h ∈ {1, 0}
means the decision on horizontal transfer, where 0 means that workers stay in
the same position and 1 means that workers move to a new position. Therefore,
Cˆ (Hn (p, h)) represents the cost of acquiring the task-specific skills required for a
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new position. Assume that there is no depreciation of human capital. We can
derive the following theorem. The formal proof is established in the Appendix.
Theorem 2. Suppose that for any set H ∈ Θ\∅, Cˆ (H) > 0. Then, the reallo-
cation cost is submodular with respect to promotion and horizontal transfer:
Cˆ (Hn (0, 0)) + Cˆ (Hn (1, 1)) ≤ Cˆ (Hn (0, 1)) + Cˆ (Hn (1, 0)) ,
where the inequality is strict if and only if
¡
Hd ∩H(i+1)¢ ∩ (Hs ∪Hi)c 6= ∅.
Figure 4 explains the intuitive logic behind Theorem 2. When employees stay
in the same position, they do not need to acquire any new skills: Hn (0, 0) = ∅.
When employees are promoted to directorships in the functional department, they
must additionally acquire all skills in the sets A or B: Hn (1, 0) = A∪B. When
employees are transferred to another functional department as section managers,
they need to acquire all skills in the sets B or C. Therefore, Hn (0, 1) = B ∪ C.
When employees are transferred to another functional department as directors,
they need to acquire all skills in the set A, B or C: Hn (1, 1) = A∪B∪C. Hence:
h
Cˆ (Hn (0, 1)) + Cˆ (Hn (1, 0))
i
−
h
Cˆ (Hn (0, 0)) + Cˆ (Hn (1, 1))
i
= Cˆ (B ∪ C) + Cˆ (A ∪B)− Cˆ (A ∪B ∪ C) = Cˆ (B) ≥ 0.
Hence, the reallocation cost is in general submodular and equality holds if and
only if B = ∅ where B = ¡Hd ∩H(i+1)¢ ∩ (Hs ∪Hi)c.
Combining the theorems 1 and 2, the following corollary follows.
Corollary 3. Suppose that for any set H ∈ Θ\∅, Cˆ (H) > 0. Then:
Pdd (i+ 1|d, d, i) ≤ Pds (i+ 1|d, s, i) ,
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where the inequality is strict if and only if
¡
Hd ∩H(i+1)¢ ∩ (Hs ∪Hi)c 6= ∅. Fur-
thermore, if the marginal benefits from multitask skills are larger for directors
than for section managers, y (d, i+ 1, x) − y (d, i, x) > y (s, i+ 1, x) − y (s, i, x),
then there exists β∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that for all β (x) ≤ β∗:
Pss (i+ 1|s, s, i) < Pdd (i+ 1|d, d, i) ≤ Pds (i+ 1|d, s, i) ,
where the inequality is strict if and only if
¡
Hd ∩H(i+1)¢ ∩ (Hs ∪Hi)c 6= ∅.
Hence, insofar as there is a task-specific skill that cannot be acquired as a
section manager in a functional department i, but is required to perform new tasks
in a functional department i + 1 and as a director, it is cost effective to transfer
employees when they are promoted. For example, if functional department i+ 1
is bigger than functional department i, dealing with a larger staff might be an
important task in functional department i+ 1. This task may also be important
for a director, but it may not be important for a section manager in functional
department i. Alternatively, if the accounting department requires more paper
work than the sales department, the tasks in the accounting department might
have similarity to those of directors.
Note that rank-specific skills and department-specific skills cannot explain re-
gion B. Region D captures general skills, and regions A and C capture director-
specific skills and functional department i+1-specific skills, respectively. However,
the skills in region B are not purely general, purely rank-specific or purely depart-
ment specific. The corollary suggests that the existence of these types of skills is
necessary in order to explain synchronized decisions of promotion and horizontal
transfer. That is, our analysis suggests that the concept of task-specific human
capital is essential in order to understand the observed synchronized decisions.
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6. From Director to Board Member
In this section, we investigate the transition from director to board member. We
raise the question of how promotion from director to board member varies across
functional departments. Note that there is no other hierarchical position between
directors and board members. Hence, if skills accumulated as directors are useful
after promotion, they are only the skills needed for the tasks of board members.
This reasoning makes us separate relatively important task-specific skills for board
members from other kinds of task-specific skills. We show later that our results
are broadly consistent with several theories on entrepreneurial ability.
Let us first describe some simple summary statistics on the speed of promotion
to board membership. Table 6 shows the average tenure and age to be promoted
to board membership, respectively. It shows that the average tenure is roughly 27
years and the average age is 54 years when one is promoted to board membership
in Japan. These numbers are also consistent with the view that the speed of
promotion in Japanese firms is slow. Interestingly, the speed of promotion to
board membership has become slightly slower over time. The average tenure was
26 years and the average age was 53.6 years in 1998, while the average tenure was
29 years and the average age was 54.3 years in 2005.
In order to obtain information on the relative importance of skills necessary
for becoming a board member, we estimate a random logit model. We assume
that promotion of the jth individual occurs between t + 1 and t if and only if
ytj ≥ 0 where ytj is an unobserved latent variable of the jth individual at year t.
We also assume that ytj is determined by:
ytj = ψ0 +
mX
h
ψhI (j ∈ h) + φ0xtj + γt + γj + εtj,
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where I (j ∈ h) is a dummy variable of functional departments to which the jth
individual belongs, xtj is a vector of observed characteristics of the jth individual
at year t, γt is a year dummy, γj is an unobserved individual-specific factor that
is independently identically normally distributed with mean 0 and variance σ2γ,
and εtj are independently identically Gumbel distributed. The control variables
are the same as those in the previous section, the details of which are explained
in the Appendix6.
Table 7 shows our estimates. The first column shows that the directors who
belong to general affairs & press, personnel, accounting and planning departments
have a higher probability of being promoted to board membership, while those who
belong to research and production departments have a lower probability7. Note
that the benchmark is the sales department. Hence, the coefficient represents the
value relative to the sales department’s value.
Although we control for standard individual characteristics, if able employees
are more likely to be assigned to these departments, the obtained result may be
influenced by this selection mechanism. In order to separate the skill accumu-
lation effect in each functional department from the selection mechanism, we use
the headquarters dummy as a proxy for unobserved ability. Our presumption
is that a worker’s boss can observe his/her unobserved ability and select an able
6For this estimation, we extract the data of individuals who are either directors or board
members, and eliminate the data of individuals who have served as board members during the
entire sample period because our focus is on estimating the determinants of directors’ promotion
to board membership. Note that after an individual becomes a board member, subsequent data
on her/him are not used for this estimation.
7“Directors in other departments” also have a higher probability of being promoted to board
membership. We consulted the chief editor in Diamond Inc. about what “other departments”
meant. He said that if they are not able to find a clear category for the positions in question-
naires, they assign it as “other departments”. Because the fraction of “other departments” is
less than 0.6 percent in the sample used for this regression analysis, it cannot be representative.
Hence, we simply report the results without any interpretation.
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worker for transfer to headquarters.
The second column shows that, as expected, the headquarters dummy has
a strong positive effect on the promotion probability, which supports our pre-
sumption. More importantly, once we control for the headquarters dummy, the
coefficients of general affairs & press, personnel, planning and production depart-
ment dummies lose their significance. Hence, only the accounting department
dummy remains positively significant, and only the research department dummy
remains negatively significant.
We are worried about the possibility that the headquarters dummy captures
a different effect than that of unobserved ability. If many general affairs &
press, personnel and planning departments are located at headquarters, it is not
surprising that the coefficients of these departments lose their significance after
controlling for the headquarters dummy. In order to examine how this possibility
influences the result, we only use observations of those working at headquarters.
Based on this relatively more homogenous sample, we obtain the same result,
which is reported in the third column: only the accounting department dummy is
positive and significant.
We also conduct other robustness checks by restricting our study to ages be-
tween 40 and 59 years and the period between 1999 and 2002. The fourth column
and fifth column report the results of these robustness checks. Although general
affairs & press and personnel departments sometimes show significance, their re-
sults are not robust. On the other hand, the coefficients of the accounting and
research & development department dummies are quite robust: the accounting
department dummy is always positive and significant, while the research & devel-
opment department dummy is always negative and significant.
How can we interpret these results? Note that the role of directors in Japan is
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different from that in the U.S. As indicated in Kaplan (1994), Japan’s corporate
governance system is said to be more consensus-oriented and boards of directors
are granted strong powers to manage the corporation. That means Japanese
board members are at least partially involved in the decision processes determining
the strategy of a company. Hence, it is reasonable to receive assistance from the
theory of entrepreneurship in order to interpret these results.
On one hand, the low promotion probability from the research department
implies that specialists are less likely to be top managers. This interpretation is
consistent with arguments in Lazear (2005). Lazear (2005) provides a theory that
agents with a balanced skill set become entrepreneurs and finds that those who
have varied work and educational backgrounds are much more likely to start their
own business than those who have focused on one role at work or concentrated on
one subject at school. As researchers are likely to focus on one subject at work,
our evidence confirms his statement.
On the other hand, the relatively high promotion probability from the account-
ing department is consistent with the view that emphasizes allocative ability as
the essence of entrepreneurial ability [e.g., Welch (1970), Schultz (1975) and Takii
(2003, 2008)]. Welch (1970) points out that the effect of education on the produc-
tion process can be decomposed into two components. Higher education enables
a worker to increase the amount of output produced from a given quantity of
inputs (the worker effect), while it also allows the worker to interpret information
about the profitability of resource allocation, which enables the worker to make
better use of resources (the allocative effect). Schultz (1975) describes allocative
ability as entrepreneurial ability and Takii (2003, 2008) models managers’ predic-
tion ability as a source of their allocative ability. Because one of the main tasks
of accounting is to allocate funds across several departments, it is reasonable to
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assume that this helps to improve managers’ ability to attain the best allocation.
This assumption is supported by evidence from case studies. Koike (2002b)
conducts several case studies on accounting departments in a Japanese company
and two British companies and finds that the most important skill in accounting
departments is predicting the source of differences between the planned budget
and actual results. Because of unexpected changes in the environment, the actual
results are always different from the original plan. Skillful managers can quickly
detect the reasons for this. Koike (2002b) insists that this skill can be obtained
only from OJT. This evidence supports our interpretation that the relatively
high promotion probability from the accounting department to board membership
indicates that allocative skill is the essence of entrepreneurial ability.
We also conduct the same estimation on firms with 1000 or more employees.
The results are reported in Table 8. Interestingly, not only the accounting de-
partment dummy but also the personnel department dummy have a significantly
positive effect on the probability of promotion to board membership. This result
does not change even when we restrict the sample to headquarters, the age to
between 40 and 59 years and the period to between 1999 and 2002. It implies
that the personnel department is quite important in large firms.
This is interesting, because a major role for personnel departments is likely to
be specific to Japan. Jacoby (2005) points out that, compared with U.S. com-
panies, human resource staffs are centralized and conduct organization-oriented
employment decisions in Japan, and that human resource departments rank rela-
tively highly in the corporate hierarchy. Jacoby (2005) also points out that per-
sonnel departments in Japan play diverse roles: managing promotion sequences
of employees, negotiating with ubiquitous enterprise unions, weighting employee
pay toward internal factors rather than market rates, maintaining centralized
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programs for employee training, organizing recreation and welfare. Hence, skills
accumulated in personnel departments are likely to be broader than allocative
ability on its own. That is, evidence suggests that the top managers in Japan’s
large firms needs not only allocative skills but also the skills to supervise workers
in order to maintain Japanese employment practices.
7. Conclusion
This paper provides new evidence on the relationship between horizontal transfer
and vertical promotion using the large personnel panel data sets available in Japan,
and interprets this evidence from the perspective of task-specific human capital.
We find that a firm synchronizes its promotion and horizontal transfer decisions.
Using the model of task-specific human capital, we interpret the evidence as the
practice of saving the reallocation cost that arise from the duplication of required
tasks. We also find that the directors who belong to accounting departments
have the highest probability of being promoted to board membership, while those
who belong to research departments have the lowest. This suggests that top
managers need balanced skill sets, in which their allocative skills are relatively
more important.
Note that our findings show that some particular pairs of movement are more
frequent than others. Evidence indicates the possibility that the transferability of
human capital is likely to be multidimensional. However, this cannot be explained
by either rank-specific skill or department-specific skill. This paper demonstrates
how the concept of task-specific skill can be used to interpret multidimensional
job mobility.
Of course, it might be possible to construct an alternative theory to interpret
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our evidence. We have no intention of denying other possibilities, but we note
that task-specific human capital can provide a coherent story from the evidence
on promotions from section managers to directors and from directors to board
membership. Hence, we believe that the concept of task-specific human capital
can be useful for obtaining guidance from the data on career paths.
Hopefully, our analysis provides a meaningful benchmark for stimulating al-
ternative theories, that make it possible to distinguish empirically the importance
of task-specific human capital from other theories.
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Table 1: Promotion Speed (Section Managers -> Directors)
Obs. Mean year S.D. Obs. Mean year S.D.
tenure 5339 23.986 6.912 3447 23.754 6.619
age 5369 48.280 4.955 3477 47.906 4.884
tenure 832 24.132 6.913 524 24.321 6.305
age 832 48.105 4.537 524 47.996 4.464
tenure 892 23.936 6.688 619 23.654 6.604
age 888 47.894 4.616 615 47.506 4.514
tenure 774 24.292 6.989 482 24.394 6.276
age 812 48.740 5.114 520 48.783 4.783
tenure 964 23.510 7.429 673 22.966 7.320
age 955 47.936 5.124 670 47.284 5.166
tenure 654 24.086 7.110 438 23.957 6.712
age 653 48.513 5.208 437 48.037 5.204
tenure 550 24.225 6.578 363 23.931 6.522
age 551 48.782 5.063 363 48.581 4.889
tenure 379 23.834 6.560 172 23.465 6.131
age 379 48.596 4.929 172 48.122 4.966
tenure 294 24.010 6.175 176 23.097 5.787
age 299 47.933 5.141 176 46.881 5.044
tenure 342 32.298 8.134 168 33.780 6.144
age 344 52.471 4.105 169 52.497 3.492
tenure 1966 23.443 6.280 1431 23.052 6.074
age 1998 48.189 4.731 1463 47.767 4.731
tenure 188 24.452 6.659 115 24.426 6.623
age 189 49.005 4.697 116 48.828 5.019
tenure 2843 23.331 6.531 1733 23.317 6.310
age 2838 47.789 4.979 1729 47.512 4.888
We define that large firms hire 1000 employees or more.
all firms large firms
Private University
Overall
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
High School
National University
Public University
1998
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Table 2: Transition Matrix (Non-Promoted Sample)
Non-Promoted Section Managers
department
general
affairs &
press
personnel accounting planning sales international affairs
research &
developme
nt (R&D)
production others total
general affairs & press 83.74 2.62 1.31 1.38 3.86 0.28 0.96 5.58 0.28 100.00
personnel 5.06 88.55 0.36 0.60 2.05 0.12 0.96 2.17 0.12 100.00
accounting 2.10 0.26 93.43 1.40 1.31 0.00 0.44 0.88 0.18 100.00
planning 1.86 1.43 0.64 80.23 5.85 0.50 5.71 3.57 0.21 100.00
sales 0.82 0.19 0.27 1.16 90.14 0.68 2.81 3.93 0.01 100.00
international affairs 0.66 0.16 0.00 1.48 5.43 87.50 2.47 1.81 0.49 100.00
research & development (R&D) 0.48 0.46 0.06 2.03 3.53 0.23 88.16 5.00 0.06 100.00
production 1.29 0.36 0.10 0.89 4.02 0.04 4.16 89.09 0.06 100.00
others 3.45 3.45 0.00 6.90 3.45 0.00 3.45 0.00 79.31 100.00
total 5.14 2.95 3.82 5.02 31.20 2.11 21.81 27.81 0.15 100.00
Non-Promoted Directors
department
general
affairs &
press
personnel accounting planning sales international affairs
research &
developme
nt (R&D)
production others total
general affairs & press 79.19 1.81 0.96 2.69 7.02 0.26 2.47 5.45 0.15 100.00
personnel 4.41 82.44 0.30 2.74 3.92 0.34 2.23 3.39 0.23 100.00
accounting 3.06 0.34 88.33 3.09 3.02 0.16 0.79 1.08 0.13 100.00
planning 2.19 0.92 1.01 73.43 8.91 0.76 8.28 4.31 0.19 100.00
sales 1.28 0.33 0.17 1.96 86.25 0.80 4.39 4.69 0.13 100.00
international affairs 0.96 0.15 0.34 2.64 12.92 78.27 2.55 2.04 0.13 100.00
research & development (R&D) 0.80 0.27 0.08 2.73 5.77 0.28 82.92 7.04 0.10 100.00
production 1.37 0.45 0.10 1.48 6.12 0.24 6.84 83.33 0.08 100.00
others 4.20 0.70 0.93 5.59 19.58 2.33 8.16 10.26 48.25 100.00
total 4.71 2.11 2.13 6.28 36.35 2.35 23.56 22.33 0.20 100.00
present term
previous term
present term
previous term
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Table 3: Transition Matrix (Promoted Sample)
Section Managers promoted to be a director
department
general
affairs &
press
personnel accounting planning sales international affairs
research &
developme
nt (R&D)
production others total
general affairs & press 48.51 5.94 3.63 7.26 17.49 0.66 4.29 10.89 1.32 100.00
personnel 15.47 53.59 0.55 7.73 9.39 0.00 3.87 8.29 1.10 100.00
accounting 7.17 1.35 67.71 7.17 8.52 0.45 1.35 3.59 2.69 100.00
planning 5.56 1.67 3.89 47.78 15.83 1.94 13.33 7.78 2.22 100.00
sales 2.17 0.53 0.66 3.28 74.14 1.55 7.79 8.50 1.37 100.00
international affairs 1.29 0.65 0.65 4.52 25.81 49.03 9.03 5.81 3.23 100.00
research & development (R&D) 1.53 0.89 0.06 5.17 9.89 0.64 65.50 14.41 1.91 100.00
production 2.28 1.07 0.38 3.79 10.62 0.63 15.23 64.85 1.14 100.00
others 0.00 0.00 8.33 12.50 16.67 0.00 12.50 4.17 45.83 100.00
total 4.84 2.52 3.04 6.75 32.87 2.12 23.02 23.11 1.73 100.00
present term
previous term
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Table 4: The breadth of transfers across departments
S.M. -> S.M. S.M. -> D.M. D.M. -> D.M.
Obs. 487 494 1598
Mean 0.114 0.333 0.165
S.D. 0.074 0.162 0.067
Obs. 52 57 60
Mean 0.109 0.328 0.169
S.D. 0.075 0.160 0.067
Obs. 62 69 71
Mean 0.111 0.325 0.168
S.D. 0.074 0.177 0.067
Obs. 66 79 88
Mean 0.113 0.335 0.166
S.D. 0.070 0.159 0.067
Obs. 96 80 145
Mean 0.116 0.326 0.165
S.D. 0.072 0.158 0.068
Obs. 71 76 205
Mean 0.118 0.330 0.163
S.D. 0.075 0.150 0.067
Obs. 54 73 269
Mean 0.125 0.332 0.161
S.D. 0.076 0.171 0.067
Obs. 86 60 760
Mean 0.116 0.375 0.158
S.D. 0.077 0.154 0.069
HQ to HQ Obs. 209 182 701
Mean 0.110 0.327 0.167
S.D. 0.079 0.180 0.072
HQ to Branch Offices Obs. 11 65 41
Mean 0.127 0.338 0.181
S.D. 0.066 0.165 0.062
Branch Offices to HQ Obs. 7 30 69
Mean 0.139 0.372 0.182
S.D. 0.082 0.148 0.063
Branch to Branch Office Obs. 260 217 787
Mean 0.114 0.328 0.161
S.D. 0.070 0.151 0.064
S.M. represensts a section manager while D.M. indicatesa  director.
2004 to2005
Overall
1998 to 1999
1999 to 2000
2000 to 2001
2001 to 2002
2002 to 2003
2003 to 2004
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Table 5: Randon Logit Estimations of Functional Transfer (Marginal Effects)
promotion (1) 1.618 *** 1.616 *** 1.637 ***
(section manager to director) (0.055) (0.056) (0.065)
director (=1) 0.498 *** 0.492 *** 0.496 ***
(0.038) (0.038) (0.043)
HQ 0.405 *** 0.403 *** 0.377 ***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.022)
company type 0.145 0.102 0.073
(0.112) (0.113) (0.159)
large firm -0.303 *** -0.318 *** -0.018
(0.075) (0.076) (0.152)
midium firm -0.425 *** -0.444 *** -0.086
(0.077) (0.078) (0.153)
small firm -0.665 *** -0.674 *** -0.373 *
(0.078) (0.079) (0.154)
national univerity 1.005 *** 1.027 *** 1.152 ***
(0.174) (0.186) (0.198)
public university 0.879 * 0.889 * 1.015 *
(0.342) (0.367) (0.395)
private university 0.573 *** 0.563 ** 0.637 ***
(0.168) (0.180) (0.192)
year dummy 
home area
manufacturing type
individual characteristics 
(tenure and other_tenure)
cohort effect
panel-lelvel variance component -0.007 -0.017 0.134 ***
constant (0.034) (0.035) (0.039)
 
Yes
Yes
    Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. The coefficients are the marginal
effects of the independent variables. The reference group for the firm size is the smaller firm where the
number of employees is 99 or less. The reference group for education is high school graduates. The cohort
effect is defined by the dummies of education times the time trend term. The dependent variable is a
dummy indicating one if an employee transferred across departments over the past year. The second
column restricts the sample to those aged 40 years or more and 59 years or less. The third column uses the
subsample covering the period from 1999 to 2002. Note that the data as of 1999 cover promotion from
1998 to 1999.
full samples
Yes
(1) (2) (3)
40-59 years of age 1999-2002
horizontal transfer
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
horizontal transfer
Yes
Yes
N
log likelihood
122464
-5.47E+04 -4.23E+04-5.61E+04
126139
Yes
94585
horizontal transfer
Yes Yes
Yes
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Table 6: Promotion Speed (Directors->Boad Members)
Obs. Mean year S.D.
tenure 8904 26.944 10.169
age 8928 53.943 3.935
tenure 711 26.065 10.838
age 710 53.644 3.650
tenure 1042 26.006 11.069
age 1043 53.896 3.897
tenure 1107 26.211 10.800
age 1111 53.838 4.038
tenure 1339 26.707 10.362
age 1346 53.913 3.781
tenure 1174 26.595 10.239
age 1180 53.704 4.230
tenure 1324 27.158 9.962
age 1332 53.978 3.819
tenure 1192 27.768 9.469
age 1187 54.149 4.070
tenure 1015 28.794 8.269
age 1019 54.345 3.852
tenure 220 29.250 12.527
age 220 54.027 4.399
tenure 3744 26.224 10.717
age 3759 54.218 3.474
tenure 357 27.868 9.455
age 359 54.312 3.543
tenure 4583 27.350 9.578
age 4590 53.686 4.265
2002
2003
2004
Overall
1999
1998
2000
2001
High School
National University
Public University
Private University
2005
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Table 7: Marginal Effects on the Promotion Probability: Random Logit Estimations (All Firms) 
0.164 * -0.067 -0.072 -0.084 -0.295 **
(0.068) (0.072) (0.112) (0.075) (0.105)
0.413 *** 0.179 0.2358 0.244 * 0.202
(0.091) (0.096) (0.150) (0.099) (0.129)
0.788 *** 0.465 *** 0.7034 *** 0.482 *** 0.436 ***
(0.082) (0.087) (0.132) (0.091) (0.118)
0.244 *** 0.011 0.0252 0.018 0.061
(0.061) (0.064) (0.098) (0.067) (0.086)
0.020 -0.174 -0.29 -0.169 -0.242
(0.097) (0.103) (0.161) (0.107) (0.138)
-0.274 *** -0.287 *** -0.4188 *** -0.267 *** -0.344 ***
(0.045) (0.047) (0.080) (0.049) (0.062)
-0.095 * 0.020 0.0396 0.020 -0.067
(0.042) (0.045) (0.081) (0.047) (0.060)
0.897 *** 0.780 ** 1.1477 ** 0.880 ** 0.678
(0.250) (0.266) (0.409) (0.283) (0.364)
1.128 *** 1.132 *** 1.036 ***
(0.041) (0.043) (0.055)
-0.434 ** -0.394 ** -0.4347 -0.383 ** -0.895 ***
(0.132) (0.140) (0.225) (0.145) (0.211)
0.061 0.422 ** 1.7912 *** 0.522 *** 0.880 ***
(0.163) (0.141) (0.108) (0.143) (0.176)
-1.41E+04
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. The coefficients are the marginal effects of the independent variables. The
reference group for departments is the sales department. There are four types of firm size determined by the number of employees: large,
medium, small and minute. The individual characteristics include individual tenure, tenure at other firms and education. The reference group
for education is high school graduates. Cohort effect 1 (2 and 3) is defined by the dummy of a national university graduate (public and private
university graduate, respectively) times the time trend term. The dependent variable "Promotion (2)" implies promotion from being a director
to board membership. The fourth column restricts the sample to those aged 40 years or more and 59 years or less. The fifth column uses the
subsample covering the period from 1999 to 2002. Note that the data as of 1999 cover promotion from 1998 to 1999.
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-2.12E+04
118448 118448 52986 87098
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
all firms
1999-2002 years 
with HQ
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
all firms
with HQ
40-59 years of age
Yes
Yes
log likelihood
N
panel-level variance
component
home area Yes
-1.36E+04
constant
Yes Yes
-2.28E+04 -2.22E+04
Yes
Yes
all firms all firms all firms
without HQ with HQ only with HQ=1
international affairs
Dependent variable:
promotion (2)
general affairs & press
personnel
accounting
company type 
HQ
planning
research & development
(R&D)
Yes Yesmanufacturing type
production
others
year dummy YesYes
cohort effect
individual characteristics Yes Yes
Yes Yes
firm size dummy YesYes
No No
Yes
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Table 8: Marginal Effects on the Promotion Probability: Random Logit Estimations (Only Large Firms) 
-0.011 -0.207 -0.227 -0.247 * -0.481 **
(0.102) (0.108) (0.169) (0.112) (0.153)
0.511 *** 0.313 * 0.454 * 0.412 *** 0.376 *
(0.116) (0.122) (0.193) (0.124) (0.153)
0.935 *** 0.632 *** 0.974 *** 0.668 *** 0.642 ***
(0.119) (0.125) (0.190) (0.129) (0.157)
0.199 * -0.028 0.003 -0.027 0.085
(0.081) (0.085) (0.129) (0.087) (0.106)
-0.030 -0.209 -0.314 -0.204 -0.302
(0.125) (0.130) (0.204) (0.135) (0.169)
-0.316 *** -0.313 *** -0.405 *** -0.300 *** -0.337 ***
(0.059) (0.061) (0.103) (0.063) (0.076)
-0.184 ** -0.047 -0.064 -0.043 -0.114
(0.059) (0.062) (0.111) (0.063) (0.078)
0.872 ** 0.719 * 1.203 * 0.676 0.627
(0.337) (0.357) (0.558) (0.377) (0.491)
1.211 *** 1.219 *** 1.118 ***
(0.055) (0.058) (0.071)
-0.918 *** -0.710 ** -0.765 * -0.678 ** -1.275 ***
(0.232) (0.244) (0.376) (0.251) (0.311)
               
0.386 * 0.639 *** 1.932 *** 0.694 *** 0.913 ***
-0.187 -0.166 0.094 (0.174) (0.221)
-8.81E+03
    Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. The coefficients are the marginal effects of the independent variables. We
use samples of large firms. A large firm is defined as having 1000 employees or more. The reference group for departments is the sales
department. There are four types of firm size determined by the number of employees: large, medium, small and minute. The individual
characteristics include individual tenure, tenure at other firms and education. The reference group for education is high school graduates.
Cohort effect 1 (2 and 3) is defined by the dummy of a national university graduate (public and private university graduate, respectively) times
the time trend term. The dependent variable "Promotion (2)" implies promotion from being a director to board membership. The fourth column
restricts the sample to those aged 40 years or more and 59 years or less. The fifth column uses the subsample covering the period from 1999 to
2002. Note that the data as of 1999 cover promotion from 1998 to 1999.
-1.25E+04-7.79E+03
79090 79090 33969 77420 61615
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
large firms
1999-2002 years 
with HQ
No
Yes
40-59 years of age
large firms
with HQ
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
large firms large firms large firms
without HQ with HQ only with HQ=1
No
Dependent variable:
promotion (2)
general affairs & press
personnel
accounting
planning
HQ
No
international affairs
research & development
(R&D)
production
others
company type 
firm size dummy
cohort effect
-1.34E+04 -1.30E+04
No
No
Yes
home area
panel-level variance
component
constant
N
log likelihood
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes Yes
Yes Yes
year dummy
manufacturing type
individual characteristics
50
8. Appendix
The Proof of Theorem 1: Let Pwvzy (w, v|z, y) denote the probability of re-
allocation from the yth functional department at rank z to the vth functional
department at rank w. Define W ∗ (r, i, x) = W (r, i, x) − ε (r, i), r ∈ {s, d}, and
W ∗ (b, i, x) =W (b, i, x)− ε (b). Then, we can derive:
Pd(i+1)si (d, i+ 1|s, i) = exp [W
∗ (d, i+ 1, x0)− C (1, 1)]
M
,
Pdisi (d, i|s, i) = exp [W
∗ (d, i, x0)− C (1, 0)]
M
,
Ps(i+1)si (s, i+ 1|s, i) = exp [W
∗ (s, i+ 1, x0)− C (0, 1)]
M
,
Psisi (s, i|s, i) = exp [W
∗
s (s, i, x
0)− C (0, 0)]
M
,
whereM = exp
⎡
⎣ W
∗
s (s, i, x
0)
−C (0, 0)
⎤
⎦+exp
⎡
⎣ W
∗ (s, i+ 1, x0)
−C (0, 1)
⎤
⎦+exp
⎡
⎣ W
∗ (d, i, x0)
−C (1, 0)
⎤
⎦+
exp
⎡
⎣ W
∗ (d, i+ 1, x0)
−C (1, 1)
⎤
⎦ and
Pd(i+1)di (d, i+ 1|d, i) = exp [W
∗ (d, i+ 1, x0)− C (0, 1)]
N
,
Pdidi (d, i|d, i) = exp [W
∗ (d, i, x0)− C (0, 0)]
N
,
whereN = exp
⎡
⎣ W
∗ (d, i, x0)
−C (0, 0)
⎤
⎦+exp
⎡
⎣ W
∗ (d, i+ 1, x0)
−C (0, 1)
⎤
⎦+exp
⎡
⎣ W
∗ (b, i, x0)
−Cb (i)
⎤
⎦.
Hence, Psd (i+ 1|i, s, d), Pss (i+ 1|s, s, i) and Pdd (i+ 1|d, d, i) can be derived by
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applying Bayes’ rule:
Pds (i+ 1|d, s, i) = 1
1 + exp {[W ∗ (d, i, x0)− C (1, 0)]− [W ∗ (d, i+ 1, x0)− C (1, 1)]}
Pss (i+ 1|s, s, i) = 1
1 + exp {[W ∗ (s, i, x0)− C (0, 0)]− [W ∗ (s, i+ 1, x0)− C (0, 1)]}
Pdd (i+ 1|d, d, i) = 1
1 + exp {[W ∗ (d, i, x0)− C (0, 0)]− [W ∗ (d, i+ 1, x0)− C (0, 1)]}
Comparing Pds (i+ 1|d, s, i) and Pdd (i+ 1|d, d, i), we can obtain the following
relationship.
Pdd (i+ 1|d, d, i) < Pds (i+ 1|d, s, i)
iff C (0, 0) + C (1, 1) < C (0, 1) + C (1, 0) .
This proves the first part of the theorem. Moreover, we can also obtain:
Pss (i+ 1|s, s, i) < Pdd (i+ 1|d, d, i)
iff [W ∗ (d, i+ 1, x0)−W ∗ (d, i, x0)] > [W ∗ (s, i+ 1, x0)−W ∗ (s, i, x0)] .
Note that
[W ∗ (d, i+ 1, x0)−W ∗ (d, i, x0)]− [W ∗ (s, i+ 1, x0)−W ∗ (s, i, x0)]
= [y (d, i+ 1, x)− y (d, i, x)]− [y (s, i+ 1, x)− y (s, i, x)] + β (x)V ∗
where V ∗ =
⎧
⎨
⎩
£R
V (d, i+ 1, x0) dFd ({ε (d, j)} , ε (b) , u)− R V (d, i, x0) dFd ({ε (d, j)} , ε (b) , u)¤
− £R V (s, i+ 1, x0) dFs ({ε (r, j)} , u)− R V (s, i, x0) dFs ({ε (r, j)} , u)¤
⎫
⎬
⎭
Because V ∗ is bounded, if y (d, i+ 1, x)−y (d, i, x) > y (s, i+ 1, x)−y (s, i, x), then
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there exists β∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that for all β (x) ≤ β∗:
Pss (i+ 1|s, s, i) < Pdd (i+ 1|d, d, i) .
Hence, the desired result is immediate. Q.E.D.
The Proof of Theorem 2: Note that Hn (0, 0) = ∅, Hn (0, 1) = ¡Hs ∪H(i+1)¢∩
(Hs ∪H i)c, Hn (1, 0) = (Hd ∪H i) ∩ (Hs ∪Hi)c and Hn (1, 1) = ¡Hd ∪H(i+1)¢ ∩
(Hs ∪H i)c. Hence, it is rewritten thatHn (0, 1) = H(i+1)∩(Hs ∪Hi)c,Hn (1, 0) =
Hd∩(Hs ∪Hi)c andHn (1, 1) = £Hd ∩ (Hs ∪Hi)c¤∪£H(i+1) ∩ (Hs ∪Hi)c¤. There-
fore:
Cˆ (Hn (0, 0)) + Cˆ (Hn (1, 1))
= Cˆ
££
Hd ∩ ¡Hs ∪Hi¢c¤ ∪ £H(i+1) ∩ ¡Hs ∪Hi¢c¤¤
≤ Cˆ ¡H(i+1) ∩ ¡Hs ∪Hi¢c¢+ Cˆ ¡Hd ∩ ¡Hs ∪Hi¢c¢
= Cˆ (Hn (0, 1)) + Cˆ (Hn (1, 0))
Because, for any set H ∈ Θ\∅, Cˆ (H) > 0, the inequality is strict if:
∅ 6= £Hd ∩ ¡Hs ∪Hi¢c¤ ∩ £H(i+1) ∩ ¡Hs ∪Hi¢c¤
= Hd ∩H(i+1) ∩ ¡Hs ∪Hi¢c .
Q.E.D.
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Appendix table: Definition of Variables
Variables Definition
promotion (1) = 1 if an individual is promoted from a director to a board member
promotion (2) = 1 if an individual is promoted from a section manager to a director
horizontal transfer = 1 if an individual transfers across departments
Department type
Sales = 1 if an individual belongs to the sales department when she/he is a director.
Personnel = 1 if an individual belongs to the personnel department when she/he is a director.
Accounting = 1 if an individual belongs to the accounting department when she/he is a director.
Planning = 1 if an individual belongs to the planning department when she/he is a director.
International affairs = 1 if an individual belongs to the international affairs department when she/he is a director.
Production = 1 if an individual belongs to the production department when she/he is a director.
Others = 1 if an individual belongs to other departments when she/he is a director.
Company type = 1 if a company is listed on a regional stock market or the JASDAQ.
HQ = 1 if an individual works in the headquarters.
Tenure is defined by the difference between the current year and the year an individual
joined the company.
 
National univ. = 1 if an individual graduated from a national university.
Public univ. = 1 if an individual graduated from a prefectural or municipal university.
Private univ. = 1 if an individual graduated from a private university.
Cohort 1 national univ. dummy × a time trend
Cohort 2 public univ. dummy × a time trend
Cohort 3 private univ. dummy × a time trend
year dummy 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005
Note that the data as of 1999 cover promotion from 1998 to 1999
Other_tenure
Middle-classified manufacturing sector where an individual belongs to a firm in the textile,
pulp/paper, chemistry, drug medicine, petroleum & coal, rubber, glassware, steel,
nonferrous metal, metal, machinery, electric, accurate instrument, transportation, or other
industries.
Manufacturing types
The block area where an individual is from (Hokkaido/Tohoku, Kita-Kanto/Koushinetsu,
Minami-Kanto, Hokuriku, Tokai, Kinki, Chugoku, Shikoku, Kyushu/Okinawa)
Home area
Other_tenure is defined by the difference between the year an individual joined the current
company and her/his graduation year.
General affairs & press
= 1 if an individual belongs to the research and development department when she/he is a
director.
Research & development 
Tenure
= 1 if an individual belongs to the department of general affairs and press when she/he is a
director.
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